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VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: GROWING 
REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK AND CHALLENGES IN THE 
EMERGING FINTECH ECOSYSTEM 
 
V. GERARD COMIZIO* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of a widely publicized explosion of new 
technology and innovation designed to disrupt the marketplace of 
traditional financial institutions in delivering financial services, the 
number of financial technology (“fintech”) companies in the United 
States and United Kingdom alone has grown to more than 4,000 in 
recent  years.    Further,  investment  in  this  sector  has  grown  from 
$1.8 billion to $24 billion worldwide in just the last five years.1   The 
financial services industry is experiencing rapid technological changes 
as it seeks to meet and anticipate business opportunities and needs, 
consumer demands and expectations, and demographic trends. In 
particular, the advent of virtual currency (“VC”), beginning  with  
Bitcoin in 2008, has quickly exploded into an emerging financial 
ecosystem composed of non-government based legal tender. This 
emergence illustrates the exciting possibilities for peer-to-peer payment 
systems, money transmission, mobile payment systems, and investment 
opportunities not only for purchasers and sellers of VC, but also for 
investors in VC business activity, and perhaps more significantly, 
consumers. As such, VC presents potential business opportunities for 
innovative fintech companies, as well as the banking and financial 
services industry. 
 
* Mr. Comizio is a partner at Fried Frank LLP, in its Washington, D.C. office, and chair of 
the Global Banking Practice group, and regularly represents financial institutions in a wide 
range of regulatory, transactional, and enforcement matters. Mr. Comizio is a member of  
the Board of Advisors of the UNC School of Law’s Center for Banking and Finance. 
1. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Regarding Special Purpose 
National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies at the Georgetown University Law Center 1 
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016- 
152.pdf; see also infra Section III.C. and accompanying notes. 
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However, the advent of virtual currencies has also brought 
significant concerns about potential illegal and fraudulent activities 
related to these currencies. Accordingly, governments, regulators, and 
law enforcement authorities worldwide have been forced to focus on the 
implications of these currencies. This focus has been dominated by 
concerns about, among other things, the use of virtual currency in illegal 
activities such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism and money laundering 
activities, and customer theft and data breaches. Virtual currencies can 
also pose existential threats to government-backed fiat currencies and  
the global economy. In this light, the growing legal and regulatory 
challenges seem clear—balancing an approach that fosters responsible 
development of an innovative technology that spurs potentially 
significant benefits with an effective legal and regulatory framework 
that protects consumers, businesses, and the financial system. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses the 
background of virtual currency—primarily Bitcoin’s development and 
legal and regulatory complications, including the Silk Road and Mt. 
Gox prosecutions that have arisen in connection with virtual currency in 
business activities.2 Part III discusses major legal, enforcement, and 
regulatory initiatives that address challenges related to virtual 
currencies, both in the United States and in countries with major 
financial services industries.3 Part IV discusses international legal and 
regulatory developments, surveying select jurisdictions with significant 
impacts on the global financial services industry.4 Finally,  Part  V 
briefly concludes with some closing thoughts.5 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Bitcoin Developments 
 
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto—the mysterious creator of 
bitcoin—triggered a potential revolution in global currencies, payment 
systems, financial services, and fintech business and regulation by 
publishing   an   eight-page   paper   entitled   Bitcoin:   A   Peer-to-Peer 
 
 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See infra Part III. 
4. See infra Part IV. 
5. See infra Part V. 
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Electronic Cash System.6 This paper offered a clear enough thesis: 
proposing a “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow 
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without 
going through a financial institution.”7 
The first bitcoin was created in 2009 after Nakamoto released 
the Bitcoin Network (“Bitcoin Network”) source code, which is the 
software and protocol that created and launched the Bitcoin Network.8 
Since its introduction, the Bitcoin Network has been under active 
development by a group of contributors, currently headed by Wladimir 
J. van der Laan, who was appointed project maintainer in 2014.9 As an 
“open source” project, an official organization or authority does not 
represent Bitcoin.10 
While technically complex, bitcoin is essentially a digital asset 
that is issued by, and transmitted through, the decentralized, open  
source protocol of the peer-to-peer Bitcoin Network.11 “The Bitcoin 
Network hosts the decentralized public transaction ledger, known as the 
Blockchain, on which all bitcoin is recorded.”12 No single entity owns  
or operates the Bitcoin Network, “the infrastructure of which is 
collectively maintained by a decentralized user base.”13 “Bitcoin can be 
used  to  pay  for  goods  and  services  or  can  be  converted  to  fiat 
 
 
6. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Oct. 
31, 2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. Much controversy and discussion has surrounded 
the true identity of Satoshi Nakamoto, and to date, no one has come forward to claim that he 
or   she   is   Nakamoto. See,   e.g.,   Who   is   Satoshi   Nakamoto?,   COINDESK,   http:// 
www.coindesk.com/information/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). 
While this article focuses primarily on legal and regulatory issues associated with bitcoin as 
the first virtual currency, there has been an explosion of virtual currencies in recent years, 
including, but not limited to ether, litecoin, peercoin, freicoin, ripple and linden dollar, 
dogecoin, primecoin, darkcoin, and primecoin. Prableen Bajpai, The Five Most Important 
Virtual Currencies Other Than Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 10, 2014, 2:45 PM), http:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/121014/5-most-important-virtual-currencies- 
other-bitcoin.asp; Reuven Cohen, The Top 30 Crypoto-Currency Market Capitalizations in 
One Place, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen/ 
2013/11/27/the-top-30-crypto-currency-market-capitalizations-in-one-place/print/. 
7. Nakamoto, supra note 6, at 1. 
8. For an in-depth discussion of bitcoin, see Winklevoss Bitcoin Tr., Registration 
Statement No. 333-189752, 13–23 (Am. No. 6 to Form S-1) (June 29, 2016) (Proposed 
bitcoin exchange traded fund). 
9. Id. at 14. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 13. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, at rates determined on Bitcoin 
Exchanges or in individual end-user-to-end-user transactions under a 
barter system.”14 
 
Bitcoin is “stored” or reflected on the digital transaction 
ledger known as the “Blockchain,” which is a digital file 
stored in a decentralized manner on the computers of 
each Bitcoin Network user. The Bitcoin Network 
software source code includes the protocols that govern 
the creation of bitcoin and the cryptographic system that 
secures and verifies bitcoin  transactions.  The 
Blockchain is a canonical record of every bitcoin 
transaction (including the creation or “mining” of new 
bitcoin) and every Bitcoin address associated with a 
quantity of bitcoin. The Bitcoin Network and Bitcoin 
Network software programs can interpret the Blockchain 
to determine the exact bitcoin balance, if any, of any 
public Bitcoin address listed in the Blockchain as having 
taken  part  in  a  transaction  on  the  Bitcoin Network.15 
 
However, this public information is limited to the address and 
does not include the identity of the user. 
 
The Bitcoin Network utilizes the Blockchain to evidence 
the existence of bitcoin in any public Bitcoin address. A 
Bitcoin private key controls the transfer or “spending”  
of bitcoin from its associated public Bitcoin address. A 
Bitcoin wallet is a collection of private keys and their 
associated public Bitcoin addresses. 
The Blockchain is comprised of a digital file, 
downloaded and stored, in whole or in part, on all 
Bitcoin Network users’ software programs. The file 
includes all blocks that have been solved by miners and 
is updated to include new blocks as they are solved. As 
each newly solved block refers back to and “connects” 
 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 39 
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with the immediately prior solved block, the addition of 
a new block adds to the Blockchain in a manner similar 
to a new link being added to a chain. Each new block 
records outstanding Bitcoin transactions, and 
outstanding transactions are settled and validated  
through such recording, the Blockchain represents a 
complete, transparent and unbroken history of all 
transactions of the Bitcoin Network. Each bitcoin 
transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin Network and 
recorded in the Blockchain . . . . 
The Bitcoin Network is decentralized and does 
not rely on either governmental authorities or financial 
institutions to create, transmit, or determine the value of 
bitcoin. Rather, bitcoin is created and allocated by the 
Bitcoin Network protocol through a “mining” process 
subject to a strict, well-known issuance schedule. The 
value of bitcoin is determined by the supply of and 
demand for bitcoin in the bitcoin exchange market (and 
in private end-user-to-end-user transactions), as well as 
the number of merchants that accept them.16 
 
B. Early Regulatory and Law Enforcement Problems 
 
1. Silk Road 
 
Silk Road was an online black market, and the first “dark net 
market,” best known as a platform for selling illegal drugs and other 
illicit goods and services purchased with bitcoin.17 Silk Road placed a 
spotlight on the “dark net” or “dark web”—hidden or so-called overlay 
networks that can only be accessed with specific software or 
authorizations, usually through either peer-to-peer file sharing networks, 
 
16.    Id. at 39–40. 
17. See David Lee, U.S. Makes Bitcoin Exchange Arrests After Silk Road Closure,  
BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/technology-25919482 (describing the 
arrest of an individual who was accused of allowing another individual to purchase and 
resell large quantities of bitcoin to “Silk Road users who want[ed] to anonymously buy 
drugs”). The Silk Road was a historical network of trade routes started during the Chinese 
Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) connecting Europe and many countries on the Eurasian 
Land Mass. VADIME ELISEEFF, THE SILK ROAD: HIGHWAYS OF CULTURE AND COMMERCE 
(2001). 
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or privacy networks,18 such as Tor,19 and perhaps more significantly, the 
ability to anonymously use bitcoin for illegal transactions—particularly 
since Silk Road in fact, only accepted bitcoin.20 
Silk Road, founded in February 2011 by Ross Ulbricht, quickly 
gained  public  notoriety  and  internet  buzz,  including  scrutiny from a 
U.S. Senator, who publicly asked U.S. law enforcement authorities, 
including the U.S. Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement 
Administration, to shut it down.21 Its notoriety was further exacerbated 
by the fact that its founder went by the swashbuckling pseudonym 
“Dread Pirate Roberts,”22 espousing a libertarian goal for Silk Road, 
posted at its website, “[t]o grow into a force to be reckoned with that  
can challenge the powers that be and at last give people the option to 
choose freedom over tyranny.”23 By 2013 the Silk Road had nearly one 
million account users, facilitating over 1.2 million transactions worth 
 
18. See generally Jessica Wood, The Darknet: A Digital Copyright Revolution, 16 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 14 (2010). 
19. Tessa Miller, How Can I Stay Anonymous with Tor?, LIFEHACKER (Jan. 10, 2014, 
2:00 PM), http://lifehacker.com/how-can-i-stay-anonymous-with-tor-1498876762; Kyle 
Torpay, BlockChain.info Launches Tor Hidden Service, INSIDE BITCOINS (Dec. 2, 2014, 2:55 
PM), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/blockchain-info-launches-tor-hidden-service/26920. 
20. See, e.g., Brian Patrick Eha, Could the Silk Road Closure be Good for Bitcoin?, 
THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/could- 
the-silk-road-closure-be-good-for-bitcoin; Amrutha Gayathri, From Marijuana to LSD, Now 
Illegal Drugs Delivered on Your Doorstep, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2011, 3:31 AM) 
http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-lsd-now-illegal-drugs-delivered-your-doorstep-290021; 
Adrian Chen, The Underground Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, 
GAWKER (June 1, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://gawker.com/the-underground-website-where-you- 
can-buy-any-drug-imag-30818160. 
21. See Schumer Pushes to Shut Down Online Drug Marketplace, NBC N.Y. (updated 
May 31, 2016, 12:49 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Schumer-Calls-on- 
Feds-to-Shut-Down-Online-Drug-Marketplace-123187958.html (highlighting the website’s 
operation and Senator Schumer’s call for federal authorities to have it removed); see also 
Kevin McCoy, Silk Road Founder Hit with Life Imprisonment, USA TODAY (May 29, 2015, 
4:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/29/ulbricht-silk-road-sentencing/ 
28072247/ (detailing the trial of Ross Ulbricht and his founding and operation of Silk Road 
since 2011). 
22. Andy Greenberg, Meet the Dread Pirate Roberts, The Man Behind Booming Black 
Market Drug Website 
Silk Road, FORBES, (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
andygreenberg/2013/08/14/meet-the-dread-pirate-roberts-the-man-behind-booming-black- 
market-drug-website-silk-road/print/. The name “Dread Pirate Roberts” was apparently 
taken from a character in the 1987 movie The Princess Bride, who was feared for his 
ruthlessness, sword fighting prowess, and well known for taking no prisoners. Id.; THE 
PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987). 
23. Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How the Feds Took Down the Dread Pirate 
Roberts, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/10/how-the-feds-took-down-the-dread-pirate-roberts/. 
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9.5 million bitcoin—approximately $1.2 billion in total money 
exchanged—in a two and a half year period.24 
After a lengthy government investigation by a host of U.S. 
federal agencies and other governments25 in October 2013, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation shut down the website and arrested Ross 
Ulbricht, prosecuting him for omnibus violations of federal drug and 
anti-money laundering laws and ordering him to pay restitution of $183 
million, representing all sales of illegal items on Silk Road.26 He was 
convicted on numerous other charges, including illegal drug sales, and 
was   sentenced   to   life   in   prison   without   possibility   of  parole.27 
 
 
24. Id. 
25. In announcing indictments of parties related to the Silk Road website, it is 
interesting to note that the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case made the following statement 
of thanks in his press release: 
 
Mr. Bharara praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and 
its New York Special Operations and Cyber Division, as well as the 
outstanding investigative work of the DEA’s New York Organized 
Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force, which comprises agents and 
officers of the DEA, the IRS, the New York City Police Department, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) Homeland 
Security Investigations (“HIS”), the New York State Police, the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Secret Service, 
the U.S. Marshals Service, Office of Foreign Assets Control, and NY 
Department of Taxation. Mr. Bharara also thanked the ICE-HIS 
Chicago-O’Hare office for its assistance and support, as well as the 
Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section and Office of International Affairs. Additionally, Mr. Bharara 
praised the foreign law enforcement partners whose contributions to the 
success of the investigation and prosecution have been invaluable, 
namely, the Australian Federal Police, the Irish Republic’s Computer 
Crime Investigation Unit of the An Garda Siochana, the Reykjavik 
Metropolitan Police of the Republic of Iceland, and the French 
Republic’s Central Office for the Fight Against Crime Linked to 
Information Technology and Communication. 
 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces 
Charges Against Three Individuals in Virginia, Ireland, and Australia for Their Roles in 
Running the “Silk Road” Website (Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Silk Road Press Release], 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against- 
three-individuals-virginia-ireland-and. 
26. See Nicole Hong, Silk Road Founder Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life in Prison, 
WALL ST. J. (updated May 29, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/silk-road- 
founder-ross-ulbricht-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-1432929957 (describing the penalties and 
punishments levied against Ulbricht, including life in prison and a $183 million forfeiture). 
27. Benjamin Weiser, Ross Ulbricht, Creator of Silk Road Website, is Sentenced to Life 
in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/nyregion/ross- 
ulbricht-creator-of-silk-road-website-is-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.html?_r=0. 
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Subsequently, others associated with the website were also prosecuted.28 
In connection with these prosecutions, the government seized over $100 
million in bitcoins, $18 million of which it subsequently sold in auction 
transactions.29 
 
2.  Mount Gox 
 
The Mount Gox website, Mtgox.com, originally registered in 
2007 by Jed McCaleb, an American entrepreneur, as a domain name for 
the purpose of turning it into a trading site for game cards of a popular 
online game, Magic: The Gathering.30 The site was live for only a few 
months but McCaleb never followed through.31 However, in late 2010, 
he decided to repurpose the domain as one of the first exchanges for the 
purchase and sale of bitcoin.32 After realizing the time and attention 
required to run the site, he sold it to Mark Karpelès while apparently 
retaining a 12% interest.33 Karpelès, after revising the site’s backend 
software, turned it into the world’s most popular bitcoin exchange, 
headquartered in Tokyo.34 Notwithstanding a security breach due to 
hacking in June 2011 that forced the site offline for several days, Mt. 
Gox became a preeminent bitcoin trading exchange.35 During 2013, 
bitcoin prices took off, climbing from $13 to more than $1,200 at its 
peak.36  By April 2013, at about the same time the Silk Road situation 
 
28. See Silk Road Press Release, supra note 25 (describing the roles of Andrew 
Michael Jones, Gary Davis, and Peter Phillip Nash in Silk Road and their indictments). 
Interestingly, Ulbricht was also accused of paying for the killing of five people, although 
none were actually killed, and he was never prosecuted regarding these allegations. Hong, 
supra note 26. 
29. Peter Svensson, U.S. Marshals to Auction Seized Bitcoin, THE SEATTLE TIMES 
(updated June 13, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/us-marshals-to- 
auction-seized-bitcoin/. 
30. Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, 
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.; see also Rachel Abrams, Matthew Goldstein, & Hiroko Tabuchi, Erosion of 
Faith was Death Knell for Mt. Gox, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2014, 6:45 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/mt-gox-files-for-bankruptcy/ (describing how the 
exchange handled 80% of all Bitcoin transactions at one point). 
35. McMillan, supra note 30. During that same time period, there were reports that 
other emerging bitcoin exchanges were also being hacked, losing customer funds, and 
simply folding by 2013. Id. 
36. McMillan, supra note 30. 
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was attracting government scrutiny and press attention, Mt. Gox had 
grown to handle 70% of the world’s bitcoin trades37 and suspended 
trading on April 11–12 for a “market cool-down.”38 
In May 2013, CoinLab filed a $75 million lawsuit against Mt. 
Gox, alleging a breach of contract.39 The companies had formed a 
partnership in February 2013 under which CoinLab handled all of Mt. 
Gox’s North American services.40  CoinLab’s  lawsuit  contended  that 
Mt. Gox failed to allow it to move existing customers from Mt. Gox to 
CoinLab.41 
On May 14, 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) obtained a warrant to seize money from Mt. Gox’s U.S. 
subsidiary’s account with payment processor Dwolla.42 The warrant 
suggests the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an 
investigative branch of the DHS, felt that the subsidiary, which was not 
licensed by the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”), was operating as an unregistered money transmitter in the 
U.S.43 Between May and July of that year, more than $5 million was 
seized.44  On June 29, 2013, nonetheless, Mt. Gox received its money 
 
 
 
37. Robert McMillan & Cade Metz, The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Bitcoin 
Exchange, WIRED (Nov. 6, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/11/mtgox/. 
According to a leaked business plan, the company at one point owned 100,000 bitcoin or 
$50 million, and Karpelès apparently owned 88% of the company. McMillan, supra note  
30. 
38. MtGox.com (@MtGox) TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2013, 7:29 AM), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20131113055800/https://twitter.com/MtGox/status/ 
322355614414147588 (“Trading is suspended until 2013-04-12 02:00 AM UTC for market 
cooldown.  Once back trading will be also faster.”). 
39. Adrian Chen, Massive Bitcoin Business Partnership Devolves Into $75 Million 
Lawsuit, GAWKER (May 2, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://gawker.com/massive-bitcoin-business- 
partnership-devolves-into-75-487857656. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See Seizure Warrant, In re the Seizure of the contents of one Dwolla account (No. 
13-1162 SKG) (D. Md. May 14, 2013) (authorizing Michael T. McFarland, Special Agent, 
U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, to seize the contents of one Dwolla account held at 
Veridian Credit Union). 
43. See id. at 2 (“[N]either Mt. Gox nor the subsidiary, Mutul Sigillum LLC, is 
registered as a Money Service Business.”). See also Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT Act”) 
Act of 2001 § 373(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2015) (prohibiting unlicensed money 
transmitting business); id. § 373(b), 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(a) (allowing the seizure of 
illegally transmitted funds). 
44. McMillan & Metz, supra note 37. 
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services business (“MSB”) license from FinCEN.45 
In November 2013, Mt. Gox customers were experiencing 
delays of weeks to months in withdrawing funds from their accounts  
and cashing out had become difficult to impossible.46  Things  grew 
worse, and on February 7, 2014, Mt. Gox halted all withdrawals.47 Less 
than two weeks later, it suspended trading, closed its website and 
exchange service, and filed for a form of bankruptcy protection under 
Japanese law to allow courts to seek a buyer.48 In April 2014, the 
company began liquidation proceedings.49 It announced that around 
850,000 bitcoin, valued at roughly $480 million at the time, belonging 
to customers and the company, was missing and likely stolen.50 
Although 200,000 bitcoin have since been “found,” the reasons for the 
disappearance—theft, fraud, mismanagement, or a combination of 
these—remain unclear.51 Shortly before Mt. Gox’s website  went  
offline, six other major bitcoin exchanges released a joint statement 
distancing themselves from Mt. Gox amid steep drops in bitcoin prices 
and new demands for government regulation of the bitcoin industry.52 
 
 
45. Vitalik Buterin, MtGox Gets FinCen MSB License, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (June 29, 
2013, 3:38 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/mtgox-gets-fincen-msb-license- 
1372534713/. 
46. McMillan & Metz, supra note 37. 
47. Matt Clinch, Bitcoin Plummets 20% After Major Exchange Halts Withdrawals, 
CNBC (Feb. 7, 2014, 6:49 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/02/07/bitcoin-plummets-20- 
after-major-exchange-halts-withdrawals.html. 
48. Abrams et al., supra note 34; Ben McLannahan, Bitcoin Exchange Mt Gox Files  
for Bankruptcy Protection, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
6636e0e8-a06e-11e3-a72c-00144feab7de. 
49. Sam Byford, Mt. Gox Abandons Rebuilding Plans and Files for Liquidation: WSJ, 
THE VERGE (Apr. 16, 2014, 1:51 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/4/16/5619636/mt- 
gox-asks-for-permission-to-liquidate; Takashi Mochizuki & Katy Stech, Mt. Gox Files for 
Liquidation, WALL ST. J. (updated Apr. 16, 2014, 2:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/news/ 
articles/SB10001424052702303663604579504691512965308. 
50. Carter Dougherty & Grace Huang, Mt. Gox Seeks Bankruptcy After $480 Million 
Bitcoin Loss, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-02-28/mt-gox-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy. 
51. Sophie Knight, Mt. Gox Says it Found 200,000 Bitcoins in ‘Forgotten’ Wallet, 
REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-mtgox- 
wallet-idUSBREA2K05N20140321. Mt. Gox’s creditors are skeptical about the ‘missing” 
bitcoins for two main reasons. Id. First, Mt. Gox announced the missing bitcoin wallet after 
an Illinois judge allowed some of the bitcoin exchange’s movements to be tracked.  Id.   
Also, blockchain evidence is available to prove Mt. Gox knew where the bitcoins were 
stored.  Id. 
52. Fred Ehrsam et al, Joint Statement Regarding Mt. Gox, THE COINBASE BLOG (Feb. 
24, 2014), http://coinbase.tumblr.com/post/77766809700/joint-statement-regarding-mtgox. 
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III. U.S. LEGAL AND REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
 
A. The Financial Crime Enforcement Network 
 
1. Virtual Currency Guidance 
 
FinCEN, charged with the mission of “safeguard[ing]  the  
[U.S.] financial system from illicit use and combat[ing] money 
laundering,”53 has issued key federal guidance clarifying how it will 
apply the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and other anti-money laundering 
(“AML”) laws to virtual currencies.54 Following FinCEN’s 2011 final 
rule on money services business, FinCEN released guidance on the 
application of FinCEN’s regulation to parties administering,  
exchanging, or using virtual currencies.55 In general, the guidance 
provides that “administrators and exchangers” of “convertible virtual 
currencies” are subject to the money transmitters (“MT”) rules, while 
“users” of virtual currencies are exempt.56 
The guidance defines a user as “a person that obtains virtual 
currency to purchase goods or services.57 An exchanger is a person 
engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual currency for real 
currency, funds, or other virtual currency.”58 “An administrator is a 
person engaged as a business in issuing (putting into circulation)  a 
virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw from 
circulation) such virtual currency.”59 
 
53. Mission, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, https:// 
www.fincen.gov/about/mission. FinCEN will also “promote national security through the 
collection analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial 
authorities.” Id. 
54. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to 
Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pts. 1010, 1021, 1022). 
55. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION 
OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSON’S ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES 1 (2013). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 2. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. “A user who obtains convertible virtual currency and uses it to purchase real or 
virtual goods or services is not a money servicing business (“MSB”) under FinCEN’s 
regulations. Id. “Such activity, in and of itself, does not fit within the definition of ‘money 
transmission services’ and therefore is not subject to FinCEN’s registration, reporting, and 
recordkeeping regulations for MSBs.” Id. 
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An  administrator  or  exchanger  that (1) accepts 
and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys 
or sells convertible virtual currency for any reason is a 
money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulations, unless a 
limitation to or exemption from the definition applies to 
the person. FinCEN’s regulations define the term 
“money transmitter” as a person that provides money 
transmission services, or any other person engaged in  
the transfer of funds. The term money transmission 
services means the acceptance of currency, funds, or 
other value that substitutes for currency from one person 
and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value 
that substitutes for currency to another location or  
person by any means. 
The definition of a money transmitter does not 
differentiate between real currencies and convertible 
virtual currencies. Accepting and transmitting anything 
of value that substitutes for currency makes a person a 
money transmitter under the regulations implementing 
the BSA.60 
 
FinCEN divided the activities of administrators and exchangers 
regarding convertible virtual currencies into three categories.61 First, 
dealing in e-currencies and e-precious metals by transmitting funds 
between a customer and a third party that is not part of the currency or 
commodity transaction.62 Second, administering  a  centralized 
convertible virtual currency and facilitating the transfer of virtual 
convertible currency between locations, or from one person to another  
in a centralized repository.63 Third, transacting in a de-centralized 
convertible virtual currency by (i) creating units of a virtual convertible 
currency with no central repository and (ii) selling those units to another 
person for real currency or its equivalent; or by facilitating the exchange 
of a de-centralized convertible virtual currency from one person to a 
 
 
60. Id. at 2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 4. 
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third party for currency, funds, or other value.64 
FinCEN also stated that because a convertible virtual currency is 
not a “real” currency, FinCEN’s Prepaid Access regulations do  not 
apply to a person who accepts or transmits a convertible virtual 
currency.65 The definition of “prepaid access” under the regulations is 
limited to “access to funds or the value of funds.”66 Similarly,  
FinCEN’s regulations regarding dealers in foreign exchange do not 
apply to accepting real currency in exchange for convertible virtual 
currency, and vice versa, because those regulations only apply to the 
exchange of one real currency for another real currency.67 
FinCEN’s new guidance did not eliminate existing exceptions to 
the definition of money transmitter. According to FinCEN, determining 
if a person is a “money transmitter” still depends on the specific facts 
and circumstances surrounding a person’s activity.68 A person who 
accepts currency, funds, or other value from one person and transmits 
such currency, funds, or other value to another location or person, is still 
not a money transmitter if the person is: 
 
• A provider of network access services to money 
transmitters; 
• A provider of bill payment services between a 
creditor or seller; 
• An operator of clearance and settlement systems 
among regulated institutions; 
• A  transporter  of  physical  currency  (such  as 
armored car services and couriers); 
• A prepaid access provider; or 
• A person who accepts and transmits funds only 
integral to the sale of goods or the provision of 
services (other than money transmission 
services) by the person who is accepting and 
transmitting the funds.69 
 
 
64. Id. at 5. 
65. Id. 
66.    Id. at 5 n.18 (citing and quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ww) (2016)). 
67.    Id. at 5–6. 
68.    Id. at 3 n. 10 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)). 
69.   Id.; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(B)(ii)(A)–(F). 
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As such, a person meeting the definition of an “administrator” 
or “exchanger” of a convertible virtual currency would not be subject to 
FinCEN regulation if one of the exceptions above applies. 
 
2.  Ripple Labs Consent Decree 
 
On May 5, 2015, virtual currency exchanger, Ripple Labs 
(“Ripple”) entered into a consent decree with FinCEN, under which 
Ripple admitted to conduct that violated the Bank Secrecy Act and other 
AML laws70 and agreed to take remedial measures to prevent future 
violations.71 Concurrently, Ripple entered into an almost identical 
settlement agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern 
District of California, U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), under which 
Ripple further agreed to cooperate with the DOJ in any investigations 
into and prosecutions of AML violations associated with Ripple’s 
conduct.72    As  part  of  the  settlement  agreement  FinCEN  assessed a 
$700,000 civil money penalty (“CMP”) against Ripple, and Ripple 
forfeited an additional $450,000 to the DOJ.73 
As FinCEN’s first BSA action against a virtual currency 
exchange the size of the CMP was viewed as substantial given that in 
recent years other money transmission businesses have been fined 
smaller amounts for repeated AML violations over several years; 
notably, Ripple and its affiliates were operating as MTs for only two 
years.74 The statement of facts and violations attached to the consent 
decree and settlement agreement sent a clear message that FinCEN and 
the DOJ expect full compliance by virtual currency companies with all 
 
 
70. For statutory and regulatory citations, as well as guidance, see FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS 
CONTROL, DSC RISK MGMT. MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, https://www.ffiec.gov/ 
bsa_aml_infobase/ documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_Manual.pdf. 
71. See Ripple of Labs, Inc., No-2015-05 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes 
Enf’t Div. May 5, 2015) (assessment of civil money penalty). In entering into the consent 
decree, Ripple admitted to: (1) willful violations of the BSA’s MSB registration, program 
and reporting requirements, as well as federal criminal law violations; (2) failure to 
implement and maintain an AML program that was reasonably designed to prevent it from 
being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities; and (3) 
failure to report suspicious activity related to several financial transactions.  Id. at 2–3. 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. Id. at 3. 
74. See id. attach. a, at 1 (describing how Ripple Labs’ subsidiary XRP Fund II, LLC 
was incorporated in 2013, which is two years before the penalty was passed down). 
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BSA/AML requirements applicable to MTs.75 FinCEN cited its recent 
guidance on virtual currency activities, noting that Ripple’s virtual 
currency sales activities obliged Ripple to register as an MT and to 
fulfill certain requirements applicable to MTs.76 These requirements 
include maintenance of an AML policy and the appointment of an AML 
compliance officer, as well as numerous recordkeeping, monitoring, and 
reporting requirements.77 Although Ripple did eventually fulfill many  
of these requirements after becoming an MT, it was penalized for the 
interim period of several months when it was not compliant, as well as 
for failing to adhere to the requirements of its AML policy in  
connection with several sales.78 
The consent decree and settlement agreement also specified 
certain remedial measures to be taken by Ripple, including: (1) creation 
and implementation of an AML training program; (2) an external audit 
of Ripple’s AML program; (3) enhancement of  Ripple’s  AML 
screening and monitoring capabilities; and (4) retroactive examination 
of transactions for previously-undetected money laundering activity, 
along with filing any required Suspicious Activity Reports on such 
activity.79 Despite mandating general compliance with BSA/AML laws, 
the remedial measures also specifically call for compliance with the so- 
called Funds Travel Rule (“Travel Rule”).80 
The Travel Rule generally requires regulated financial 
institutions, including MTs, to retain and include in payment  
instructions certain information related to the payment and its 
participants, so that a funds transfer can be traced from end to end even 
if it passes through multiple intermediary financial institutions.81 
Traditional payment systems such as credit card, ACH, and wire are 
closed systems set up to support the entry and transmission of the 
required information fields between participants, who must be regulated 
 
 
75. See id. attach. a, at 4–6 (listing violations of the AML/BSA requirements). 
76. Id. attach. a, at 4. 
77. Id. attach. b, at 3–4. 
78. Id. attach. a, at 5. 
79. Id. attach. b, at 2–4. 
80. Id. attach. b, at 4. 
81. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(e) (2016) (“Each agent, agency, branch, or office located 
within the United States of a financial institution other than a bank is subject to the 
requirements of this paragraph (e) with respect to a transmittal of funds in the amount of 
$3,000 or more . . . .”). 
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depository institutions.82 “However, . . . most cryptocurrencies are open 
systems and users do not need to go through a financial institution in 
order to effect transactions.”83 Commentators have observed that  
finding out whether any given counterparty is a financial institution and 
complying with the resulting Travel Rule requirements, while 
maintaining the privacy—and indeed personal safety—of individuals, 
presents an ongoing challenge for cryptocurrency businesses.84 
 
B. New York Department of Financial Services–Creating a 
BitLicense and Trust Company Digital Currency Exchange 
Charter 
 
On August 12, 2013, the New York Department of Financial 
Services (“NYDFS”), citing New York’s “long history of promoting 
technical innovation—both within the financial sector and across our 
economy,” announced that it had launched an inquiry into the 
appropriate regulatory guidelines that it should put in place for virtual 
currencies.85 Based on the fact that  it  had  already  conducted 
“significant preliminary work” regarding the announced inquiry, 
including making requests for information from virtual currency firms,86 
the NYDFS expressed concern that “at a minimum,” “virtual currency 
exchanges may be engaging in money transmission as defined in New 
York law, an activity that is licensed and regulated by [NY]DFS.”87 
While referencing the unique opportunities and challenges 
presented by Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, NYDFS nevertheless 
stressed that instances “where the cloak of anonymity provided by 
virtual currencies has helped segment dangerous criminal activity, such 
as   drug   smuggling,   money   laundering,   gun   running,   and   child 
 
 
82. Id. 
83. Dsu-Wei Yuen, FinCEN and Department of Justice Settle Anti-Money Laundering 
Charges Against Crypto-Currency Company Ripple Labs, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP: 
PAYMENT LAW ADVISOR (May 12, 2015), http://www.paymentlawadvisor.com/2015/05/12/ 
fincen-and-department-of-justice-settle-anti-money-laundering-charges-against-crypto- 
currency-company-ripple-labs/. 
84. See, e.g., id. 
85. BENJAMIN M. LAWSKY, N.Y. STATE DEP’T. OF FIN. SERVS., NOTICE OF INQUIRY ON 
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/ 
vc_01282014/notice_20130812_vc.pdf. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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pornography.”88 As such, NYDFS observed that “[i]f virtual currencies 
remain a virtual Wild West for narcotraffickers and other criminals, that 
would not only threaten [U.S.] national security but also the very 
existence of the virtual currency industry as a legitimate business 
enterprise.”89 
As such, NYDFS cited three reasons for “putting in place 
regulatory safeguards that would be beneficial to the ‘long-term 
strength’ of the virtual currency industry:” 
 
First, safety and soundness requirements help 
build greater confidence among customers that the funds 
that they entrust to virtual currency companies will not 
get stuck in a digital black hole. . . . Taking steps to 
ensure that these transactions—particularly 
redemptions—are processed promptly is vital to earning 
the faith and confidence of customers. 
Second, serving as a money changer of choice 
for terrorists, drug smugglers, illegal weapons dealers, 
money launderers, and human traffickers could expose 
the virtual currency industry to extraordinarily serious 
criminal penalties. Taking steps to root out illegal 
activity is both a legal and business imperative for  
virtual currency firms. 
Finally, both virtual currency companies—and 
the currencies themselves—have received significant 
interest from investors and venture capital firms. Similar 
to any other industry, greater transparency and 
accountability is critical to promoting sustained, long 
term investment.90 
 
On November 14, 2013, the NYDFS announced, “as the next 
step in [its] inquiry,” that it would hold a public hearing on virtual 
currency regulation.91   With an asserted focus on the interconnection 
 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 2. 
91. Rob Wile, New York Will Be Holding Hearings on Bitcoin, BUSINESS INSIDER  
(Nov.  4,  2013, 2:43  PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-to-hold-hearings-on- 
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between money transmission regulations and virtual currency, NYDFS 
noted that the hearings would also focus on the “possibility and 
feasibility of NYDFS issuing a ‘BitLicense’ specific to virtual currency 
transactions    and    activities,     which     would     include    anti-
money laundering and consumer protection requirements for licensed 
entities.”92 
The NYDFS conducted a year-long process, including two days 
of public hearings on January 28–29, 2014, where NYDFS heard from 
virtual currency investors, law enforcement agencies, and academics on 
virtual currency issues. Subsequently, in March 2014, the NYDFS 
announced a public order (“NYDFS VC Order”) initiating a process for 
accepting licensing applications for virtual currency exchanges under  
the N.Y. banking laws.93 Citing a demonstrated need for stronger 
oversight of virtual currency exchanges after the Mt. Gox collapse, 
NYDFS opted to offer a digital currency exchange banking charter 
pursuant to its authority to grant limited, special purpose trust company 
charters.94 The NYDFS VC Order also stressed that the new charter 
should contain strong legal and operational controls, including “robust 
BSA/AML requirements.”95 
Following submission of a number of applications, on May 7, 
2015, NYDFS granted a charter to itBit Trust Company LLC (“itBit”)  
to operate as a commercial bitcoin exchange, the first virtual currency 
company to receive such a charter from NYDFS.96 In  granting  
approval, the NYDFS press release stressed that it had conducted a 
“rigorous review” of the application, including, but not limited to, the 
company’s “anti-money laundering, capitalization, consumer protection 
and  cyber  security  standards.”97   Furthermore,  the  release  noted that 
 
bitcoin-2013-11 (containing full text of NYDFS press release). 
92. Id. 
93. N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., IN RE VIRTUAL CURRENCY EXCHS., ORDER PURSUANT TO 
NEW YORK BANKING LAW §§ 2-B, 24, 32, 102-A AND 4001-B AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 
§§ 301(C) AND 302(A), (2014). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Grants First Charter to a New 
York Virtual Currency Company (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter itBit Press Release], http:// 
www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1505071.htm; see also itBit Trust Company, LLC 
Authorization Certificate, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. (May 6, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/ 
banking/auth_cert_itBit_052015.pdf. 
97. itBit Press Release, supra note 96. Since approving the itBit Charter, the NYDFS 
approved a second virtual currency exchange charter.  See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. 
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itBit would be required to meet the obligation for operating a trust 
company under N.Y. law, as well as those under the final N.Y. 
BitLicense regulations.98 
Prior to the itBit approval, on July 17, 2014, NYDFS had 
proposed for public comment a BitLicense regulatory framework for 
virtual currency firms.99 These first-of-a-kind rules provided 
comprehensive regulatory regimes applicable to a wide variety of  
virtual currency businesses.100 The framework, which  includes 
consumer protection, anti-money laundering, NYDFS examination and 
suspension requirements, and cyber security rules, books, records, 
financial disclosure capital adequacy, and audit requirements, was met 
with mixed reaction by the virtual currency industry. The industry 
responded with concerns that regulations could stifle innovation, while 
realizing that the then-recent Mt. Gox scandal had reinforced regulatory 
and law enforcement concerns about the virtual currency business.101 In 
February 2015, NYDFS published an updated BitLicense framework 
that incorporated feedback from the first round of public comments.102 
The updated proposal, which was adopted in June 2015, contained a 
series of changes and clarifications, including the creation of a two-year 
transitional BitLicense to assist start-ups.103 
 
 
 
 
Servs., NYDFS Grants Charter to “Gemini” Bitcoin Exchange Founded by Cameron and 
Tyler Winklevoss (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1510051.htm 
(describing the charter issued and giving a timeline of NYDFS virtual currency regulation). 
98. itBit Press Release, supra note 96. 
99. Proposed Rule on the Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses,  
29 N.Y. Reg. 14 (July 23, 2014). Full text of the BitLicense Proposal is available from the 
NYDFS’s website at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf. See 
also Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., NYDFS Releases Proposed BitLicense 
Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Firms (July 17, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/ 
about/press/pr1407171.htm. 
100. See 29 N.Y. Reg. 15. NYDFS specifically referenced the fact that the same week 
NYDFS issued its notice of inquiry on virtual currencies a national magazine published an 
interview with an alleged key figure in the “black market drug website” Silk Road, who  
cited the virtual currency Bitcoin as a key ingredient in the site’s efforts to commit illegal 
acts.  See Greenberg, supra note 22; supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying notes. 
101. Id. 
102. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Notice of Revised BitLicense Regulatory Framework, 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/rev_bitlicense_reg_framework.htm; see also 
Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Business, 37 N.Y. Reg. 17, 18 (Feb. 25, 
2015) (revising NYDFS BitLicense regulations). 
103.    37 N.Y. Reg. 8 (June 24, 2015). 
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C. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency–The Fintech 
Charter 
 
In the wake of a multi-year effort by NYDFS to pioneer the 
establishment of a regulatory framework for a state chartered, special 
purpose, fintech trust charter focused on virtual currency business 
activities, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) has 
sought to take a lead in this area by announcing, in 2016, initiatives 
designed to create a special purpose national bank charter for fintech 
business activities. In August 2015, the OCC announced it would 
“develop a comprehensive framework to improve the OCC’s ability to 
identify and understand trends and innovations in financial services, as 
well as the evolving needs of consumers of financial services.”104 
Following the announcement, the OCC published a paper in March 
2016 entitled, Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal 
Banking System: An OCC Perspective (“OCC Innovation Paper”).105 
Noting, among other things, the broad innovation in financial 
services taking place “outside the banking industry, often in unregulated 
or lightly regulated fintech companies,” the OCC Innovation Paper 
stressed that fintech companies are “growing rapidly, and attracting 
increase[ed] investment” both in the U.S. and globally.106 The OCC 
Innovation Paper concluded that bank and nonbank innovators, through 
“strategic and prudent collaboration,” could benefit by employing their 
respective advantages” nonbank innovators can gain access to funding 
sources and large customer bases” and “banks can gain access to new 
technologies.”107 
The OCC Innovation Paper became the springboard for the 
OCC’s subsequent efforts to create a fintech charter.  To date, however, 
a number of issues have arisen with respect to the OCC’s project. First, 
while OCC special purpose banks such as trust and credit card banks are 
exempt  from  parent  company  regulation  under  the  Bank  Holding 
 
 
 
104. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE 
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 3 (2016) [hereinafter 
OCC INNOVATION PAPER], https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other- 
publications-reports/pub-responsible-innovation-banking-system-occ-perspective.pdf. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 4. 
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Company Act (the “BHCA”),108 it is not clear whether the Federal 
Reserve Board (the “FRB”) would be comfortable with the creation of a 
new bank charter exempt from the BHCA.  Second, state regulators  
have raised significant concerns as to whether the project is a 
preemption Trojan horse, i.e., a way to route nonbank lending and other 
activities around state usury and other consumer laws through a national 
charter.109 Third, virtual currency companies and trade  groups  have 
urged that such charters be structured so as to be  user-friendly  for 
virtual currency activities.110 Finally, there has been speculation about 
potential FDIC concerns about regulation and receivership of non- 
depository fintech charters; notably, the OCC recently proposed a rule 
that would make clear that the OCC would handle all OCC uninsured 
national bank failures.111 
Nonetheless, on December 7, 2016, the OCC announced that it 
would move forward with chartering fintech companies that offer bank 
products and services to become special purpose national banks.112 
Accompanying this decision, the OCC published a paper entitled, 
Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech 
Companies113 (“OCC Fintech Charter Paper”), discussing the issues and 
 
108. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq. (2015). 
109. See Lalita Clozel, OCC Fintech Charter Tramples States Rights: N.Y. 
Superintendent, AM. BANKER (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:18 PM) (noting that the applicable law to 
fintech companies is unclear); Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Balk at OCC Fintech Charter, 
AM. BANKER (Aug. 19, 2016, 5:08 PM) (noting that a national fintech charter could weaken 
state authority over consumer protection laws). 
110. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh & Jerry Brito, Comments to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency on Supporting Responsible Innovation, COIN CENTER (May 27, 
2016). 
111. See Proposed Rule on Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 
62835 (proposed on Sept. 13, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 51) (stating that the 
OCC would conduct receiverships for banks that are not insured by the FDIC). In that 
rulemaking, referring the OCC Innovation Paper, the OCC stated that–in undertaking the 
rulemaking, one of its reasons it is considering how best to implement a regulatory 
framework that is “receptive to responsible innovation, such as an advance in financial 
technology,” and “in conjunction with this effort, considering whether a special purpose 
charter could be an appropriate entity for the delivery of banking services in new ways,” and 
thus, requesting comments on the utility of proposed necessary rules to such a special 
purpose bank.  Id. at 62837. 
112. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC to Consider 
Fintech Charter Applications, Seeks Comment, (Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter OCC Fintech 
Press Release], https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016- 
152.html; see also Thomas J. Curry, supra note 1, at 3 (“[T]he OCC will move forward with 
chartering financial technology companies that offer bank products and services and meet 
our high standards and chartering requirements.”). 
113. OFFICE  OF  THE  COMPTROLLER  OF  THE  CURRENCY, EXPLORING  SPECIAL  PURPOSE 
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conditions that the agency will consider in granting special purpose 
national bank charters, with a request for public  comment.114  In  so 
doing, the OCC raised a number of significant points and issues related 
to attributes and regulation of the new charter. 
First, the OCC identified the potential universe of fintech 
companies that may explore a special purpose charter—such as 
marketplace lenders providing consumer and small business loans, 
payment-related services, companies engaged in digital currencies and 
distributed ledger technology, and financial planning and wealth 
management products and services.115 Second, OCC fintech chartered 
banks “would be held to the same rigorous standards of safety and 
soundness, fair access and fair treatment of customers that apply to all 
national banks.”116 Third, the OCC  “may  need  to  account  for 
differences in business models and the applicability of certain laws.”117 
It specifically cited as an example “a fintech company with a special 
purpose national bank charter that does not take deposits, and therefore 
is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), 
[and thus] would not be subject to laws that apply only to depository 
institutions.”118 As such, the OCC Fintech Charter Paper clarifies prior 
confusion in this area by making clear that OCC’s policy is that special 
purpose national banks that do not engage in deposit taking are not 
required to obtain deposit insurance.119 
Fourth, notably, the OCC did not take the position that creating 
a national bank fintech charter required a notice and public comment 
rulemaking process, nor is the agency proposing one.  As such, the OCC 
 
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS  FOR FINTECH COMPANIES  (2016)  [hereinafter  OCC   FINTECH 
CHARTER PAPER], https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/ 
special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf. 
114. Id. at 15 (public comments were submitted through January 15, 2017). 
115. Id. at 2. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See id. Notably after some prior confusion about whether the OCC would require 
deposit insurance for national trust banks, the OCC’s recent Proposed Trust Bank 
Receivership Rules also stated: “There are only a small number of uninsured national banks 
in operation today. The OCC, however, retains the authority to grand new charters to  
entities whose business plan does not call for them to obtain deposit insurance if the OCC 
determines that the entities have a reasonable chance of succeeding and can operate in a safe 
and sound manner, among other considerations.” Proposed Rule on Receiverships for 
Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 62835 (proposed on Sept. 13, 2016) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. Part 51). 
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will be issuing such charters under its existing authority to grant special 
purpose national bank charters.120 Whether this position opens the OCC 
to the possibility of legal challenges regarding its authority to do so 
without a rulemaking process subject to the Administrative Procedure 
Act remains to be seen. Fifth, a special purpose national bank that 
conducts administrative activities other than the trust and fiduciary 
activities “must conduct at least one of the following core banking 
functions: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money.”121 
Interestingly, the OCC generally observed that “there is no legal 
limitation on the type of ‘special purpose’ for which a national bank 
charter may be granted, so long as the entity engages fiduciary activities 
or in receiving deposits, paying checks or lending money.”122 In so 
doing, it also stated that “the OCC has the legal authority to construe 
these activities to include a wide range of bank permissible technology- 
based innovations in financial services”—including considering “on a 
case-by-case basis the permissibility of a new activity that a company 
seeking a special purpose charter wishes to conduct.”123 
Sixth, “in general, a special purpose national bank will be 
subject to the same laws, regulations, examinations, reporting 
requirements, and on-going regulation and supervision as other national 
banks.”124 Other laws that will apply to special purpose national banks 
include: industry laws, lending and consumer financial laws, BSA and 
AML laws, OFAC rules and sanctions, “prohibitions on engaging in 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or  practices 
under section 1036 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) . . . and bank chartering 
regulations  and  licencing  policies.”125    Seventh,  “a  special  purpose 
 
120. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 3; see also National Bank Act §§ 
324-5138, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–26 (2012).; Home Owners’ Loan Act §§ 301–375, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1461–69 (OCC authority to grant national bank charters, which the OCC has interpreted to 
include special purpose national banks). 
121. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 116, at 3; See also Organizing a 
National Bank or Savings Association, 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (required banking activities). 
122. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 3–4. 
123. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 4. 
124. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5. 
125. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5. See also Rules, Policies and 
Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. Part 5 (2012) (OCC bank chartering paper); 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL: 
CHARTERS       (2016),      https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing- 
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national bank also has the same status and attributes under federal law  
as a full service national bank;” notably this includes limits on state 
visitorial powers, “federal preemption (including the OCC preemption 
regulations) and federal judicial precedents to determine if or how a 
state law applies,”126 and all “hot button” issues addressed in the Dodd- 
Frank Act.127 Eighth, the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) and 
certain provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that only apply 
to depository institutions would not apply to an uninsured special 
purpose trust bank.128 
Ninth, coordination with other regulators may be required, such 
as the FRB to become members of the Federal Reserve System and  
meet requirements of the BHCA,129 the FDIC where a fintech company 
proposes to access deposits other than trust funds, and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau for compliance with federal consumer 
financial laws.130 Tenth, the OCC sets its “baseline supervising 
expectations” to meet “high supervisory standards.”131 Baseline 
supervisory expectations stress, among other things, the importance of a 
“detailed business plan, governance, capital, liquidity, compliance risk 
management, financial inclusion, and recovery resolution planning.”132 
 
manuals/charters.pdf. 
126. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER supra note 113, at 5. 
127. In this regard, the OCC stated: 
For example, under these statues, rules and precedents, state laws would 
not apply if they would require a national bank to be licensed in order to 
engage in certain types of activity or business. Examples of state laws 
that would generally apply to national banks include state laws on anti- 
discrimination, fair lending, debt collection, taxation, zoning, criminal 
laws, and torts. In addition, any other state laws that only incidentally 
affect national banks’ exercise of their federally authorized powers to 
lend, take deposits, and engage in other federally authorized activities 
are not preempted. Moreover, the OCC has taken the position that state 
laws aimed at unfair or deceptive treatment of customers apply to 
national banks. 
OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 5. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1044, 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012)  
(state law preemption standards for national banks). 
128. Id. 
129. For example, qualifications for one of the exemptions from the definition of “bank” 
within the BHCA, and thus, any parent company or control entity is exempt from regulation 
as a bank holding company. See Bank Holding Company Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012) 
(exemptions from “bank” definition under the BHCA such as for trust banks). 
130. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 6-8 and accompanying notes. 
131. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 8. 
132. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 8 and accompanying notes. 
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Eleventh, distinct from any CRA obligatory, special purpose 
bank applicants that seek to engage in lending activities must 
demonstrate a commitment to the “global issue” of “financial inclusion” 
that supports “fair access to financial services and fair treatment of 
customers.”133 Twelfth, the OCC will review business plans to include 
alternate business “recovery and exit strategies,” stress test scenarios, 
and worst-case resolution plans.134 The mandated planning requiring 
stress tests and resolution planning resembles the requirements 
applicable only to systematically important financial institutions 
(“SIFIs”) under the Dodd-Frank Act.135 
Thirteenth, as part of the OCC chartering process, the OCC will 
impose certain standard requirements when a bank is granted 
preliminary approval, as well as other conditions as appropriate.136 
Fourteenth, as has been done with other special purpose national banks 
such as trust funds, the OCC may modify or adapt capital and other  
legal requirements.137 These changes would lead to a process of 
negotiation on appropriate capital levels on certain business activities, 
although any new OCC precedents will be revised as the agency grants 
new charters for particular business models.138 Finally, the OCC 
requested public “feedback” (ostensibly as opposed to “comments” if it 
were seeking notice and comment in a public rulemaking, rather than a 
paper) on a wide range of issues.139 
 
133. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 11–13 and accompanying notes; 
see generally OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 116, at 12 n.30 (for an analysis of 
financially unserved and financial inclusion). 
134. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 12–13. 
135. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
204(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(1) (2015) (stating that the section “provide(s) the necessary 
authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial 
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral 
hazard”). 
136. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes; see 
also, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CONDITIONAL APPROVAL #1143 
(Jan. 2016). 
137. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes. 
138. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 14 and accompanying notes 
(stating that “the OCC would consider adapting requirements applicable to a fintech 
applicant for a special purpose national bank charter to the extent consistent with applicable 
law”). 
139. OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 15–16. Specifically, the OCC 
asked for feedback regarding the following: 
1. What are the public policy benefits of approving fintech companies to operate under a 
national bank charter?  What are the risks? 
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Within a few days of the announcement, the NYDFS 
Superintendent issued a public statement strongly opposing the charter 
and any efforts “to federalize what states have been doing–and doing 
well–for over a quarter of a century,” asserting that “[h]istory has 
demonstrated that states, not the federal government, have the requisite 
knowledge and experience to effectively regulate nondepository 
financial services providers and guard against predatory and abusive 
practices.”140 
 
 
2. What elements should the OCC consider in establishing the capital and liquidity 
requirements for an uninsured special purpose national bank that limits the type of 
assets it holds? 
3. What information should a special purpose national bank provide to the OCC to 
demonstrate its commitment to financial inclusion to individuals, businesses and 
communities? For instance, what new or alternative means (e.g., products, services) 
might a special purpose national bank establish in furtherance of its support for 
financial inclusion? How could an uninsured special purpose bank that uses innovative 
methods to develop or deliver financial products or services in a virtual or physical 
community demonstrate its commitment to financial inclusion? 
4. Should the OCC seek a financial inclusion commitment from an uninsured special 
purpose national bank that would not engage in lending, and if so, how could such a 
bank demonstrate a commitment to financial inclusion? 
5. How could a special purpose national bank that is not engaged in providing banking 
services to the public support financial inclusion? 
6. Should the OCC use its chartering authority as an opportunity to address the gaps in 
protections afforded individuals versus small business borrowers, and if so, how? 
7. What are potential challenges in executing or adapting a fintech business model to  
meet regulatory expectations, and what specific conditions governing the activities of 
special purpose national banks should the OCC consider? 
8. What actions should the OCC take to ensure special purpose national banks operate in  
a safe and sound manner and in the public interest? 
9. Would a fintech special purpose national bank have any competitive advantages over 
full-service banks the OCC should address? Are there risks to full-service banks from 
fintech companies that do not have bank charters? 
10. Are there particular products or services offered by fintech companies, such as digital 
currencies, that may require different approaches to supervision to mitigate risk for  
both the institution and the broader financial system? 
11. How can the OCC enhance its coordination and communication with other regulators 
that have jurisdiction over a proposed special purpose national bank, its parent 
company, or its activities? 
12. Certain risks may be increased in a special purpose national bank because of its 
concentration in a limited number of business activities. How can the OCC ensure that 
a special purpose national bank sufficiently mitigates these risks? 
13. What additional information, materials, and technical assistance from the OCC would 
a prospective fintech applicant find useful in the application process? 
OCC FINTECH CHARTER PAPER, supra note 113, at 15–16. 
140. N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., STATEMENT BY N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. 
SUPERINTENDENT MARIA T. VULLO REGARDING THE OCC SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK 
CHARTER FOR FINTECH COS. (2016) http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1612021.htm. 
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D. Uniform State Law: The Regulation of Virtual Currency 
Business Act 
 
 
In February 2016, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) published a discussion draft  of 
the Regulation of Virtual Currency Business Act (“VC Business 
Act”).141 As with its other similar projects, the VC Business Act is 
designed to provide a uniform state law governing the operation of a 
business, wherever located, that engages in the “virtual currency 
business.”142 The term virtual currency business is broadly defined to 
include offering virtual currency transfer and storage services, 
facilitating virtual currency transfers, offering the conversion of virtual 
currency, or otherwise offering services and products that assist 
residents of a state or jurisdiction to acquire, convert, or transfer virtual 
currency.143 It similarly provides broad definitions of terms such as 
virtual currency,144 virtual currency business activity,145 and what 
constitutes a transfer of virtual currency.146 The comments to the VC 
Business Act (the “Comment”) note that its overall goal is to capture 
activities that meet the definition of “virtual currency business 
activity.”147 
 
141. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT REGULATION OF 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT, (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT], http:// 
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%20virtual%20currencies/ 
2016feb_RVCBA_Mtg%20Draft.pdf; see generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT (June 3, 2016) 
(providing a later draft of the proposed act). 
142. See DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 1 (“This [act] governs the 
operation of a person, wherever located, that engages in or holds itself out as engaging in 
virtual currency business activity with a  resident of this [state].”). 
143. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §102(a)–(d). 
144. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §§102(a)–(d), 103(24), (“Virtual 
currency means any digital unit of value that is used as a medium of exchange or that 
substitutes in a transaction for money but that is not money. The term includes digital units 
of exchange that (i) have a centralized repository or administrator, (ii) have no centralized 
repository or administrator, or (iii) may be created or obtained by computing or 
manufacturing effort.”). 
145. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 103(25). 
146. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 103(25), 103(19) (stating that 
“transfer” includes “any change in ownership, possession or power to execute or prevent 
transactions”) 
147. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. The Comment noted that questions 
arise including whether the “virtual currency” definition should include “e-precious metals” 
and e-certificates for precious metals that can be transferred from one owner to another. In  
so doing, the Comment stated that FinCEN “issued guidance in August 2015 that extended 
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In considering other issues such as how to include an “on-ramp” 
for new entrants to the virtual currency business, de  minimus 
exceptions, and whether to differentiate principal versus intermediary 
activities, the draft also presented a final question that concerned 
coverage or exclusion of trust companies who receive their charters and 
powers from states.148 The Comment noted that New York State issued  
a trust company charter to itBit in 2015.149 ItBit’s ability to engage in 
transactions with residents of other states was challenged by other states 
and, thus, for this draft information about inclusion or exclusion of trust 
companies is “bracketed” until the Drafting Committee can further 
discuss this issue with particularity.150 
As such, the Comment raises the question of  what  happens 
when one state that is participating in a reciprocal arrangement, creates  
a special purpose digital currency exchange trust charter,  but  other 
states do not recognize it as such.151 To date, however, no effort has  
been made by states to invoke reciprocity arrangements governing the 
interstate activities of traditional trust companies.152 
In this regard, the draft VC Business Act specifically addresses 
reciprocal licensing arrangements, providing three alternatives for 
reciprocity and instructing that “a jurisdiction  should  select  one.”153 
The draft VC Business Act also addresses a wide range of business and 
 
 
its March 2013 guidance concerning what types of business activity with virtual currency 
render the business a ‘money services business’ for the purposes of federal AML 
requirements under 31 C.F.R. Part X.” Compare DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, 
at 9, with FIN-2015-R001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Issuing  
Physical or Digital Negotiable Certificates of Ownership of Precious Metals, FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT   NETWORK,   U.S.   DEP’T    OF   TREASURY   3   (August   14,   2015), https:// 
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/administrative_ruling/FIN-2015-R001.pdf (including e- 
precious metals and e-certificates for precious metals), 
148. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. 
149. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. 
150. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. 
151. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at 9. 
152. See, e.g., Lalita Cozel, Are Trust Charters the Key to Simplifying Fintech 
Regulations, AM. BANKER (November 8, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are- 
trust-charters-the-key-to-simplifying-fintech-regulation (discussing the fact that the  only 
two digital currency exchanges licensed by New York State as special purpose trust 
companies have had significant challenges making the case to regulators of their trust status 
outside New York, due, among other things, causing uncertain scenarios for these 
companies). Cozel notes that there are “uncertain scenarios in a number of states that simply 
do not have experience with digital currency or digital currency exchange.” Id. (quoting V. 
Gerard Comizio, Fried Frank LLP). 
153. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 203. 
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regulatory aspects of such businesses, including licensing and 
applications,154 net worth and minimum capital requirements,155 
authority to conduct regulatory examinations,156 cooperation and data 
sharing authority,157 change in control and merger regulatory standards 
and approvals,158 records maintenance,159 confidentiality,160 license 
suspension and revocation,161 cease and desist orders,162 civil money 
penalties,163 end user disclosure protections,164 and compliance policies 
with procedures.165 Interestingly, the Committee has reserved important 
topics such as cyber security programs and monitoring, business 
continuity with disaster recovery program requirements,  and 
permissible investments for further discussion.166 
It remains to be seen whether the VC Business Act is timely 
adopted as a model code, and, if so, whether it becomes an influential 
model for state legislatures in adopting virtual currency legislation. 
However, previous model codes of the NCCUSL have made enormous 
contributions to national legal uniformity in many significant areas.167 
For example, model codes of corporate, commercial, and financial law 
that have been widely accepted and adopted by states have reduced the 
need for businesses to deal with different laws as they move and do 
business in different states.168 
 
154. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at §§ 202, 203. 
155. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 207. 
156. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 301. 
157. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 302. 
158. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 303. 
159. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 304. 
160. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 305. 
161. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 501. 
162. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 502. 
163. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 504. 
164. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 702. 
165. DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141, at § 901. 
166. See DRAFT VC BUSINESS ACT, supra note 141 at §§ 401, 402, 801, 802 [Reserved] 
(declining to offer guidance). 
167. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of 
Uniform Law, 35 J. CORP. L. 327 (2009). “[S]tates tended to widely adopt NCCUSL 
proposals where uniformity was efficient—that is, where the parties’ conduct or transactions 
may be subject to the laws of several different states, making it difficult to determine at the 
time of the conduct, or even at the time of litigation, which state law will apply, and where 
the affected parties cannot easily settle these issues by contract.” Id. at 330, 360.  
Conversely, developing a model code “necessitates compromises that undermine 
uniformity.” Id. 
168. See id. at 330 (discussing the value of uniform laws “where the parties’ conduct or 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Outside of the U.S., virtual currency laws, regulations, and 
policies are emerging globally. This section surveys a few select 
jurisdictions with significant impact on the global financial services 
industry: (1) the European Union (“EU”), (2) the United Kingdom 
(“UK”), (3) the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (4) China, 
and (5) Japan. While this survey is by no means comprehensive, only a 
handful of countries have specific regulations applicable to virtual 
currency use; at least forty jurisdictions, exclusive of the EU, have 
ventured to varying extents into regulation of virtual currency.169 
 
A. The European Union: The European Bank Authority 
 
In   the   wake   of   the 2008   global   financial   crisis,   the    
EU established the European Banking Authority (“EBA”) as an 
independent authority designed to, among other things, ensure effective 
and consolidated prudential regulation and provide supervision across 
the EU banking sector.170 The purpose of the EBA “is to contribute to 
the creation of the European Single Rulebook in banking whose 
objective is to provide a single set of harmonized prudential rules for 
financial  institutions  throughout  the  EU.”171    Further,  the  EBA  is 
 
 
transactions may be subject to the laws of several different states”). 
169. See GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LL File 
No. 2014-010233, REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (Jan.2014), http:// 
www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoin.pdf (surveying  bitcoin 
regulation in forty countries and the EU); see also Kashmir Hill Bitcoin’s Legality Around 
The World, FORBES (January 30, 2014, 6:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 
2014/01/31/bitcoins-legality-around-the-world/#1e84a28379b2 (discussing the report 
compiled by the Law Library of Congress); Cameron Fuller Bitcoin Around the World:  
How Virtual Currencies Are Treated in 40 Different Countries, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2014, 4:16 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-around-world-how-virtual-currencies-are- 
treated-40-different-countries-1553532 (discussing the report compiled by the Law Library 
of Congress); Brian Patrick Eha, How the World’s Richest Nations Are Regulating Bitcoin, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.entrepeneur.com/article/231294 (discussing 
regulation in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.). 
170. See Regulation 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/ 
78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 [hereinafter EBA Reg.] (establishing the EBA); About Us, 
EBA, www.eba.europa.eu/about-us, (last visited Jan. 28, 2016); see also V. Gerard  
Comizio, INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 325–39 (West Academic 2016) 
171. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170. 
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charged with promoting the “convergence of regulatory practices and 
assessing the risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector”—the 
world’s first supranational financial services regulator.172 In its short 
time in existence, the EBA has weighed in heavily on virtual 
currencies.173 First, in December 2013, the EBA issued its Warning to 
Consumers on Virtual Currencies.174 The asserted reason for the 
publication was to issue a “warning to highlight the possible risks . . . 
[associated with] buying, holding or trading virtual currencies such as 
Bitcoin.”175  The publication highlighted the potential risks including  
the possibility of “losing your money” in the context of the fact that 
“[n]o specific regulatory protections exist that would . . . cover losses if 
a platform that exchanges or holds . . . virtual currencies fails or goes 
out of business.”176 
In encouraging consumers to understand the risks associated 
with virtual currencies, the publication stressed the following potential 
risks: 
 
• “you may lose your money on the exchange 
platform,” including through theft and hacking 
by third parties, 
• “your money may be stolen from your digital 
wallet,” 
• “you are not protected” when using virtual 
currencies as a means of payments,” 
• “the value of your virtual currency can change 
quickly, and could even drop to zero,” 
• “transactions in virtual currency may be misused 
for criminal activities, including money 
laundering,” and 
 
172. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170. The EBA was established 
as part of the European System of Financial Supervision, and, pursuant to EU Regulation 
1093/2010, took over all existing responsibilities and tasks of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors. EBA Reg., supra 170; About Us, EBA, supra note 170. 
173. See Report of the European Banking Authority, Warning to Consumers on Virtual 
Currencies, EUROPEAN    BANKING    AUTH. Passim (Dec. 12, 2013), https:// 
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/598344/EBA+Warning+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf 
(discussing what is involved in the use of virtual currency). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1. 
176. Id. 
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• “holding virtual currency may have tax 
implications,” including value added or capital 
gains tax.177 
 
Finally, customers were warned that, in buying virtual 
currencies, consumers should not use “real” money that they cannot 
afford to lose nor keep large amounts of money in a digital wallet for 
extended periods of time, but should become familiar with the 
ownership, business model, transparency, and public perceptions of any 
digital currency trading exchange platform they may consider using.178 
As a follow up to its warning published in 2013, the EBA issued 
its Opinion on Virtual Currencies179 (“VC Opinion”) in July 2014. 
Stressing that one of the tasks of the EBA is to “monitor new and 
existing financial activities,” and promulgate  appropriate  regulations 
and guidance, the EBA noted that its 2013 warning did not address 
“whether VCs can or should be regulated.”180  While noting that there  
are some potential benefits of VCs, for example, “reduced transaction 
costs, faster transaction speed, and financial inclusion,” the risks, by 
contrast,     “are     manifold.”181     The     ECB      identified      more 
than seventy perceived risks across several categories, including: “risks 
to users, risks to non-user market participants, risks to financial integrity 
such as money laundering and other financial crimes, risks to existing 
payment systems in conventional fiat currencies, and risks to regulatory 
authorities.”182 Thus, the EBA determined that a regulatory approach 
that addresses VC risks comprehensively requires “a substantial body of 
regulation” as part of having a “‘long-term regime.”183 
The EBA made two recommendations for mitigating “some of 
the more pressing risks.”184 First, the EBA recommended that all EU 
national regulatory authorities advise credit and financial institutions, 
 
 
177.    Id. at 2–3. 
178. Id. at 3. 
179. Opinion on “Virtual Currencies”, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH. (July 4, 2014), 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014- 
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf. 
180. Id. at 5. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
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payments institutions and e-money institutions against buying, selling, 
or holding VCs for their own account.185 In addition, the EBA “also 
recommends that EU legislators consider declaring market participants 
at the direct interface between conventional and virtual currencies, such 
as virtual currency exchanges, [so-called] ‘obliged entities’ under the 
EU [AML] Directive and thus subject to its [AML] and counter terrorist 
financing requirements.”186 
As a result, prompted by the terrorist attacks in France in 2015, 
the European Commission adopted proposals in response to the EU 
Council’s conclusions of February 2016 regarding the fight against the 
financing of terrorism.187 These proposals underlined the importance of 
achieving rapid progress of legislative actions, including in the field of 
virtual currencies, and called on the Commission to submit targeted 
amendments to EU Law.188  The European Parliament (“EP”) published 
a parallel resolution and report in May 2016, in which the EP proposed, 
inter alia, that the Commission develop recommendations for any 
legislation needed to regulate the VC sector.189 
In response to the legislative initiatives, the EBA published an 
opinion responding to the commission’s proposal and set out seven 
proposals that the EU commission and co-legislators should take into 
account when finalizing the VC amendments to EU law.190 These 
proposals included recommendations regarding the scope of VC 
licensing, enforcement sanctions, control standards, information 
exchange, and application of AML laws.191 
 
 
 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 6. 
187. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Presents Action Plan to 
strengthen the fight against terrorist financing (Feb. 2, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press- 
release_IP-16-202_en.htm. 
188. Id. 
189. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, RESOLUTION ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 6 (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA- 
2016 0228+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
190. Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the EU Commission’s to Bring 
Virtual Currencies into the Scope of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (4DMLD), EUROPEAN 
BANKING AUTH. (Aug., 11 2016), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1547217/ 
EBA+Opinion+on+the+Commission%E2%80%99s+proposal+to+bring+virtual+currency+e 
ntities+into+the+scope+of+4AMLD. 
191. Id. 
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B. The United Kingdom 
 
In August 2014, the U.K. government announced a program 
looking into the particular benefits and risks associated with digital 
currencies and underlying technology, with a particular focus on the 
question of regulation.192  In November 2014, the government published 
a request for public comment to gather views and evidence on these 
questions and received over 120 responses from “members of the public 
who use digital currencies, digital currency developers, business 
providing digital currency-related services, banks, payment scheme 
companies, academics, consultancies, and other government 
departments and agencies.”193 
In March 2015, Her Majesty’s Treasury published a report, 
Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information (the “HM 
Treasury Report”), that summarized stakeholder response regarding the 
benefits and risks of digital currency, but also significantly reached 
certain conclusions regarding next steps related to potential digital 
currency regulation.194 The HM Treasury Report noted respondents 
mentioned two factors in particular, which “were highlighted as the 
 
192. Rt. Hon George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Launch of  
the New Trade Body for Fintech, “Innovative Finance”, HM TREASURY (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-on-developing-fintech. 
193. HM TREASURY, DIGITAL CURRENCIES: RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR INFORMATION 3 
(2015) [hereinafter HM TREASURY REPORT]. It is interesting to note that the call for 
information also asked for views on the impact of FinCEN application of anti-money 
laundering  regulations  to administrators and exchangers  of  digital  currencies.   Id.  at  13. 
 
On the whole, responses from digital currency firms (including a  
number which operate and are regulated in the U.S.) were positive, 
reporting that regulation has increased the legitimacy of digital currency 
firms, helped firms establish banking partnerships and investment, and 
deterred criminals. Despite this, however, various submissions 
commented that there is a lack of clarity about which categories of 
business activity are captured by FinCEN requirements, and some said 
that the process of registering in multiple American states has been 
burdensome and has forced smaller firms to exit the market. A number 
of submissions also commented on the proposed ‘BitLicense’ 
framework that has been put forward by the New York Department of 
Financial Services. Digital currency firms answering on this agreed that 
the proposed BitLicense regime, at least as initially drafted, would be 
too wide in scope and would impose very high compliance costs on 
digital currency firms and risk damaging the sector. 
 
Id. at 13. 
194.    Id. at 19–20. 
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main challenges digital currency businesses faced setting up in the 
U.K.”195 Most respondents “mentioned the lack of a regulatory 
framework for digital currencies, commenting that this has caused some 
uncertainty for businesses and has made it difficult for the industry to 
prove its credibility and legitimacy.”196 The  second  prevalent  factor 
“was that digital currency firms have encountered difficulties in opening 
bank accounts in the U.K. . . .”197 In this vein, “[m]any businesses 
described how they have been forced to open bank accounts overseas, 
which results in day-to-day business being slower and drives up 
costs.”198 
Many respondents saw these issues as connected. For example, 
“[s]ubmissions from the [U.K.] banking sector highlighted a lack of 
regulation as a key reason for hesitation amongst banks [in accepting] 
digital currency firms as customers.”199 Additionally, many digital 
currency firms mentioned “the lack of access to banking as closely 
related to the regulatory system.”200 With respect to “the question of 
what steps the government could take to support the industry, many 
responses focused on the question of bringing the sector into 
regulation.”201 Well over two-thirds of responses “addressed whether  
the government should introduce regulation of any kind” and more than 
80% of these responses expressed the view that the “sector should have 
some form of regulation . . . .”202 
The HM Treasury Report acknowledged that “[t]he government 
considers that digital currencies represent an interesting development in 
payments technology, with distributed, peer-to-peer networks and the 
use of cryptographic techniques making possible the efficient and  
secure transfer of digital currency funds between users,” with potential 
advantages “clearest for purposes such as micro-payments and cross- 
border transactions.”203 However, even while taking note of  the  
benefits,   the   HM   Treasury   Report   also   concluded   that   “digital 
 
195. Id. at 8. 
196. Id. at 8. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 9. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
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currencies have so far been adopted by a relatively small number of 
consumers and retailers around the world, and both the technology, and 
the industry that has grown up around it, are still in a nascent state.”204 
Further, the HM Treasury Report also conceded that “[t]he evidence 
suggests that [a] market in which digital currency firms are operating is 
not functioning as well as it could, and there is a good case for 
proportionate regulation at this time to provide a supportive  
environment for legitimate digital currency users and businesses.”205 
Notably, the HM Treasury Report also extensively discussed concerns 
about potential risks presented by digital currency in relation to crime, 
money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion, sanctions evasion, 
and how such potential risks could be mitigated by appropriate 
regulations.206 
The UK government response to these concerns was twofold. 
First, it stated that while the evidence available indicates that illicit 
actors have used digital currencies, the information does not suggest  
that digital currencies have, at present, been widely adopted as a 
payment vehicle in the wider criminal community.207 The government 
noted that the degree of anonymity and the ease of making payments are 
key drivers for potential criminal uses and the anonymous use of digital 
currencies is closely linked to the absence of an effective “know your 
customer” regime being in place.208 Second,  the  government  
recognized the “broad support” for “proportionate, but robust, anti- 
money laundering regulation in order to limit the abuse of digital 
currencies by criminals or terrorists, and to support development and 
innovation in the sector.”209 
Among its conclusions, the HM Treasury Report noted that the 
HM Treasury is dedicated to the creation of measures that are intended 
to “create the right environment for legitimate actors to flourish, and to 
create a hostile environment for illicit users of digital currencies.”210 It 
also highlighted the importance of a favorable regulatory climate to 
protect consumers, while simultaneously discouraging the use of digital 
 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 11. 
207.    Id. at 11–12 
208. Id. at 14. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 19. 
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currency exchanges in furtherance of illegal conduct.211 First, the 
distinctive features of digital currencies can be attractive to illegal users 
as well as people and businesses that wish to use digital currencies for 
legitimate purposes.212 In response, the government intends to apply 
anti-money laundering regulation to digital currency exchanges, to 
support innovation and prevent criminal use.213 The government 
committed to, and has since began “a full consultation on the proposed 
regulatory approach . . . [to] seek views and evidence on key questions 
including how anti-money laundering regulation should be applied to  
the digital currencies sector, the scope of the regulatory [framework], 
and the identity of the regulator.”214 Second, as part of the consultation 
on the proposed regulatory approach, the government will look at how 
to ensure that law enforcement bodies have “effective skills, tools, and 
legislation to identify and prosecute criminal activity relating to digital 
currencies, including the ability to seize and confiscate digital currency 
funds where transactions are for criminal purposes.”215 
Finally, due to the “nascent state of the technology and the 
surrounding industry,” digital currencies offer various risks.216 To 
counteract this potential exposure, the U.K. “government consider[ed] 
that a framework for best practice standards for consumer protection 
[was] the right step to take at this stage, in order to address the risks 
identified, but without imposing a disproportionate regulatory burden on 
the industry,” and “intend[ed] to work with . . . the digital currency 
industry to develop pioneering voluntary standards for consumer 
protection.”217 Since the HM Treasury Report, the U.K. has begun 
exploring various regulatory initiatives related to digital currency, while 
at the same time stressing the desire for the U.K. to be a global center  
for fintech.218 
 
 
 
211.    Id. at 11,19. 
212. Id. at 11. 
213. Id. at 19. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. See, e.g., Peter Campbell, Osborne Wants London to be Global Centre for FinTech, 
THE FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015) (stating that the Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that 
UK regulators will provide “space where innovation can happen”). 
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C. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
A working committee of the Bank for International Settlements 
Committee on Banking Supervision,219 the Committee on Payments and 
Market Infrastructures (the “CPMI”), among other things, aims at 
“strengthening regulation, policy[,] and practices” in the payment 
system, clearing settlements[,] and related arrangements.220  In 
November 2015, the CPMI issued a report on digital currencies (the 
“CPMI Report”), in considering the “possible implications of interest to 
central banks” worldwide arising from innovations in digital 
currencies.221 The CPMI Report concluded that regulatory issues for 
digital currencies based on distributed ledgers cover three main fields: 
“consumer protection, prudential and organizational rules for the 
different stakeholders, and specific operating rules as payment 
mechanisms.”222 Further, the CPMI Report concluded that given the 
nature of digital currencies, “which are typically online and therefore 
not limited to national jurisdictions,” a global approach may be 
important for regulation to be fully effective.223 Nonetheless, the CPMI 
Report stressed that the need for a global approach does not preclude 
certain actions at the national level, identifying at least five general 
categories of action: 
 
• Information/moral suasion: rather than 
interfering directly with the development of 
digital currencies, authorities could decide to use 
moral suasion towards users and investors in 
order to highlight the relevant risks and to 
influence the market. 
 
• Regulation   of   specific   entities:   via   such an 
 
 
219. See generally V. Gerard Comizio, INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 184–211 (West 
Academic 2016) (discussing the role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 
global banking regulation). 
220. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures–Overview, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS (last updated May 13, 2015), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf. 
221. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2015). 
222. Id. at 12. 
223. Id. 
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institutional approach, authorities could establish 
a limited set of regulations for specific types of 
entities (e.g., those that enable interaction 
between digital currencies and traditional 
payment instruments and/or the real economy). 
Firms that might be subject to specific regulation 
include intermediaries providing digital 
currency-related services such as exchanges, 
merchant acceptance facilities, and “digital 
wallet” applications enabling users to store and 
transact in their units of the digital currency. 
 
• Interpretation of existing regulations: some 
authorities may be able to assess whether 
existing regulatory arrangements might be 
applied to digital currencies and digital currency 
intermediaries. One example is the area of 
taxation law, where authorities have made 
determinations of how tax legislation might 
apply to digital currency arrangements. 
 
• Broader regulation: although jurisdictional  
issues are likely to be a challenge, authorities 
might seek to take a broader approach to 
regulation, potentially reflecting a functional 
approach such that regulatory obligations that 
apply to traditional payment methods and 
intermediaries also apply to digital currency 
schemes and digital currency intermediaries. As 
an example, authorities might seek to ensure that 
AML/know-your-customer (“KYC”) 
requirements apply to digital currency 
transactions and counterparties, or that the same 
consumer protection arrangements apply to 
transactions conducted with digital currencies as 
to other payment methods used by consumers. 
 
• Prohibition: authorities could seek to ban the use 
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of digital currencies in their respective 
jurisdictions. Practically, this could imply a ban 
on any digital currency based financial activities, 
as well as digital currency exchanges or digital 
currency        acceptance        by        retailers.224 
 
Finally, the CPMI Report concluded that “[t]hese categories 
[could] provide a general framework for the analysis and classification 
of actions undertaken by national authorities.”225 
 
D. China 
 
In December 2013, the Chinese central bank announced that all 
Chinese financial institutions and payments systems were barred from 
handling virtual currency.226 The notice from the  Peoples  Bank  of 
China (the “PBOC”) stated that the ban was imposed because  no  
“nation or central authority” backed bitcoin.227 The PBOC stated that it 
was “planning to step up its efforts to curb the use of bitcoins to launder 
cash.”228 Individuals were advised that they were “still free to trade in 
bitcoins, but should be aware of the risks involved.”229 The notice 
detailed that PBOC “planned to formalize the regulation of exchanges 
that dealt in digital currency.”230 Further, Alibaba, China’s top internet 
retailer, announced on January 9, 2014, that it was prohibiting the use of 
bitcoin on its online shopping platforms, thereby rendering the practical 
use of bitcoin even more challenging in China, despite massive investor 
interest in virtual currencies within the country.231 
Notwithstanding   the   foregoing,   the   PBOC   Governor Zhou 
 
 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. See Joe McDonald, China Bans its Banks from Handling Bitcoin, BUSINESS  
INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2013, 3:43 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/peoples-bank-of-china- 
warns-on-bitcoin-2013-12; China Bans Banks From Handling Bitcoin Trade, BBC Online 
News (Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter BBC News], http://www.bbc.com/news/technology- 
25233224. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Charters Piley, Alibaba bans Bitcoin Amid China Crackdown, CNN MONEY (Jan.  
9, 2014, 12:32 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/09/news/bitcoin-alibaba/. 
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Xiaochuan subsequently stated that China would not seek to ban  
bitcoins and other virtual currencies entirely.232  He further observed  
that he viewed bitcoin as “more of a kind of tradable and collectible 
asset, such as stamps rather than a payment currency.”233 
 
E. Japan 
 
Japan has taken a proactive role in regulatory virtual currency 
business activities, through its (1) Funds Settlement Law, (2) Banking 
Act, and (3) Anti-money Laundering Laws. 
 
1.  Funds Settlement Law 
 
The Funds Settlement Law,234 aimed at protecting users of 
settlement services and enhancing the safety and efficiency of such 
systems, was recently amended to directly regulate virtual currency 
exchange operators (“VCEOs”), which include domestic virtual 
currency exchange operators (“DVCEOs”) and foreign virtual currency 
exchange operators (“FVCEOs”).235 Amendments are scheduled  to 
come into effect no later than June 3, 2017 (the “New Funds Settlement 
Law”). 236 
VCEO Business, a term of art as defined by the New Funds 
Settlement Law, is a business that engages in: (a) trading virtual 
currencies or exchanging virtual currencies with other  virtual  
currencies, (b) acting as a broker, intermediary, or agent for the 
transactions  detailed  in  (a),  or  (c)  managing  customers’  monies   or 
 
 
232. Pete Rizzo, China’s Central Bank Governor: PBOC Won’t Ban Bitcoin, COINDESK 
(April 11, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/chinas-central-bank-governor-pboc- 
wont-ban-bitcoin/ (quoting Xiaochuan as saying: “It is out of the question  of  banning 
bitcoin as it not started by a central bank.”). 
233. Id. 
234. 資金決済に関する法律Shikin kessai ni kansuru hōritsu [Funds Settlement Law], 
Law No. 59 of 2009 (Japan). 
235. Id.; TSUTOMU HIRAISHI & TADASHI KOIZUMI, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT: 
NEW LAW ALLOWING FOREIGN NON-BANKING ENTITIES  TO  ENGAGE  IN  THE  MONEY 
TRANSFER BUSINESS IN JAPAN (2009), yourbusiness/newsletter/bankingfinance/ 
Client%20Alert_New%20Fund%20settlement%20Law.pdf. 
236. Jōhō tsushin gijutsu no shintentou no kankyō henka ni taiō suru tame no ginkōhōtō 
no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [New Funds Settlement Law], Law No. 62 of 2016 (Japan); 
JONES DAY, JAPAN LEGAL UPDATE VOL. 15 (2016), http://thewritestuff.jonesday.com/cv/ 
66fd66a19aa605da38cc6b132f83b37ed90e648b. 
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virtual currencies as part of (a) or (b).237 Under the New Funds 
Settlement Law, an entity, domestic or foreign, seeking to offer VCEO 
services in Japan is required to register with the Prime Minister.238 The 
statute assumes that any business operating with respect to Japan is to  
be regulated.239 How one’s activities in Japan are evaluated for the 
regulatory applicability is not entirely clear. Even if Japanese presence  
is limited to online availability, there is a possibility that a VCEO 
business will nevertheless be caught within the law’s regulatory scope 
since exchange services are inherently continuous in nature and are 
aimed at a broad audience.240 
In order for a FVCEO241 to be granted registration, it must have  
a local business office as well as a locally residing representative.242 A 
FVCEO, unless registered under this law, is explicitly prohibited from 
conducting marketing aimed at customers in Japan.243 VCEOs who 
engage in digital currency exchange services without registration, 
whether foreign or domestic, are subject to criminal punishment of up  
to three years of imprisonment, three million yen of fines, or both.244 
Other registration requirements include being in sound financial 
standing identified by: minimum capital requirements, net assets, and 
prescribed by cabinet order;245 a sound operational  management 
structure; and, other structures that ensure compliance with the law.246 
Once registered, VCEOs (including FVCEOs) will be required to  
adhere to the following conditions:247 
 
237. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 2, para. 7. 
238. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 37. 
239. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art 37. 
240. See 江頭憲治朗=中村直人「論点体系会社法6」第 一 法規 (2011 年) 69頁
(discussing how the Companies Act would determine whether a foreign company would be 
required to register in Japan). If further confirmation on this point is desired the Japanese 
Financial Services Agency’s opinion can be sought on a no-names basis. Id. 
241. A FVCEO is defined as a digital currency exchange operator that operates in and is 
registered (or similarly regulated) under laws similar to the New Funds Settlement Law in a 
foreign country.  New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 2, para. 9. 
242. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-5, para. 1. 
243. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-22. 
244. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 107. 
245. Relevant ordinances have not yet been promulgated. 
246. The specific content is undefined. 
247. DVCEOs under the New Funds Settlements Law is defined as any entity registered 
as such under Article 63-2. The Law assumes the FVCEOs will also be registered under 
Article 63-2. As such, a VCEO referenced under this Law would include FVCEOs which 
are also locally registered.  Hence, FVCEOs would be subject to provisions applicable for 
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• Mandatory customer session: upon entering into 
a contract, users must be given explanations on 
fees and other contractual terms.248 
 
• Segregation of funds and auditing requirements: 
VCEOs are required to segregate its own funds 
from the clients’ and have a CPA or auditor 
periodically review such fund status.249 
 
• Grievance resolution: as a general rule, a VCEO 
will be required to contract with a designated 
VCEO alternative dispute resolution institution 
in order to resolve complaints.250 
 
• Reporting requirements: registered VCEOs are 
required to record and preserve books  and 
submit business reports to the Prime Minister.251 
 
• Supervision: authorities will have the right to 
enter into the VCEOs facilities, issue Business 
Suspension Orders and revoke registration, 
among others.252 
 
As Japan implements these new requirements they will continue 
to strengthen the influence of their funds settlement regulations.253 
 
 
 
 
DVCEOs.  New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-5, para. 1. 
248. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-10. 
249. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-11. 
250. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-12. 
251. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-13, 14. 
252. New Funds Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 63-15, 17. 
253. See TSUTOMU HIRAISHI & TADASHI KOIZUMI, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT: 
NEW LAW ALLOWING FOREIGN NON-BANKING ENTITIES  TO  ENGAGE  IN  THE  MONEY 
TRANSFER BUSINESS IN JAPAN (2009), yourbusiness/newsletter/bankingfinance/ 
Client%20Alert_New%20Fund%20settlement%20Law.pdf (predicting that the New Fund 
Settlement Law “could bring about remarkable changes in the fund settlement and the fund 
transfer businesses in Japan.”). 
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2. Banking Act and Fund-Transmitting Transaction Business 
 
Fund-transmitting transaction businesses (kawase torihiki) are 
licensed entities that may engage in activities that only banks and 
registered funds transfer service providers are allowed to conduct. 254 
Fund-transmitting transactions are defined as “transactions achieved by 
agreeing to transmit funds at the request of a client by not directly 
transporting the money but by using a mechanism to transmit funds, or 
agreeing to do such and carrying it out.”255 Because virtual currencies 
can be used as a convenient and cost-efficient way to transfer funds,  
they may be viewed as fund-transmitting transaction services.  Under  
the Banking Act, however, virtual currencies are not regarded at this 
point as “funds”256 and sending virtual currency, by itself, would not be 
seen as a fund-transmitting transaction. However, if a user deposits 
funds at a local bank account that is converted to virtual currency, 
transferred to a receiver’s digital account, and then converted to fiat 
currency, it may be argued that the sender is essentially transmitting 
funds to the receiver.257 
 
3. Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: Act on Prevention of Transfer 
of Criminal Proceeds 
 
In line with the above revisions to the Funds Settlement Law, 
the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation Act (the “AMLA”)258 was 
amended to include VCEOs in the list of designated businesses required 
to implement measures to detect and report potential money laundering 
activities.259 Specifically, designated businesses are required to have 
institutional mechanisms in place to conduct sufficient KYC procedures 
at  the  time  of  account  opening,  collect  and  preserve  KYC  and 
 
254. Ginkō-hō [Banking Act] Law No. 59 of 1981, art. 4, para. 1, art. 2, para. 2 (Japan); 
Money transmitters are only allowed to conduct such services for values of less than one 
million yen.  Funds Settlement Law, supra note 234, art. 2, para. 2, art. 3, art. 37. 
255. Banking Act, supra note 254, art. 61, para. 1, art. 64, para. 1; New Funds 
Settlement Law, supra note 236, art. 107. 
256. Banking Act, supra note 254. 
257. Yoshihiro Kataoka, FinTech’s Current Status and Legal Issues, ITU J. Vol . 46,  
No. 7 (2016). 
258. Hanzai ni yoru shūeki no iten bōshi ni kansuru hōritsu [Criminal Proceeds Act], 
Law No. 22 of 2007 (Japan). 
259. Id. 
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transaction records, and report suspicious transactions to the 
authorities.260 Like the New Funds Settlement Law, amendments to the 
AMLA will come into effect no later than June 3, 2017. Further clarity 
to the amended AMLA is expected in an upcoming cabinet order. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As virtual currency business activities and related fintech 
companies continue to emerge and develop, they will continue to  
present new and growing legal and regulatory challenges. The artistry 
for governments and regulatory authorities will continue to be balancing 
developments of innovative virtual currency technologies that will 
potentially bring significant benefits with an effective legal and 
regulatory framework that protects consumers, businesses, and the 
financial system.261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260. There is no direct criminal punishment for non-compliance; however, if an entity 
continues to disregard its KYC and reporting obligations despite receiving a Business 
Improvement Order from the authorities, it may be subject to criminal punishment of up to 
two years of imprisonment or three million yen in fines.  Id. art. 25, art. 18. 
261. As a follow up to the White House Fintech Summit in June 2016, the outgoing 
Obama Administration recently published a White Paper through the National Economic 
Council entitled A Framework for FinTech. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE, A 
FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH 1 (2017); see also Adrienne Harris & Alex Zerden, A Framework 
for FinTech, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Jan. 13, 2017, 6:36 PM), www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/ 
01/13/framework-fintech. This document sets forth policy objectives for the fintech sector 
through “ten overarching principles that constitute a framework policy makers and 
regulators can use to think about, engage with, and assess the fintech ecosystem in order to 
meet these policy objectives.” Id. 
